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INTRODUCTION
Every country experiences important changes in its society, polit-
ical system, and economy while developing and growing. Social mo-
bility and economic deprivation; rapid economic advancement and
social dislocation; political demands and economic diversification;
are all normal outcomes of the process of development. As Mexico's
economy evolved from the 1920s on, its society became more diver-
sified and increasingly complex. This brought about increasing so-
cial and political pressures. During the 1960s those pressures be-
came paramount.
By the late 1960s Mexico's economy was under pressure to ex-
pand. This was difficult because the domestic market was too small
to support an economic scale that would manufacture products that
measured up to world price and quality standards. In addition, ag-
ricultural exports, which had been used to finance industrial im-
ports, declined while the population increased. This situation com-
pelled the government to change course by gradually allowing
foreign imports, thus forcing industry to compete and generate ex-
ports to pay for its own imports.
During the 1970s Mexico's government, like many other govern-
ments in the world, used public spending to enhance the domestic
market and to reduce social and political pressures. From 1972
through 1981 the artificial growth of the internal market combined
with massive inflows of foreign exchange which resulted from for-
eign indebtedness and oil exports. This allowed continuous eco-
nomic growth. By the early 1980s, the scheme began to fail and the
country found itself in the midst of a deep recession. Additionally,
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Mexico faced extremely high levels of foreign debt and an indus-
trial program that has not, and cannot, work in the 1980s.
I. COPING WITH THE 1982 CRIsIs
In 1982 Mexico found itself in the midst of its worst crisis in
recent history. The rapid accumulation of foreign debt increased
the debt service cost far beyond the country's means and the reti-
cence of the government to devalue the peso fostered capital flight.
There was an enormous growth in imports and a virtual elimination
of manufactured exports. By the end of 1981 the combination of
these factors made 1982 a year of crisis. In August of 1982, when
international banks ceased to roll over existing short term credit,
the debt bomb exploded.
Other things also went wrong during 1982. Employment in the
manufacturing industry fell by 7% in one year. Real interest rates
declined by more than 65%. Prices soared and the economy im-
ploded, shrinking by one-half of one percent. Inflation was 38% in
1981 and ended 1982 at 100%. In September of 1982, the govern-
ment expropriated private banks and introduced exchange controls.
On December 1, 1982, the current administration came into office
and immediately set out to reverse these imbalances and overcome
the crisis situation. Four years later, the current government shows
little promise of reversing the imbalances and overcoming the crisis.
The aftershocks of the 1982 crisis have been severe and pro-
longed, due to the lingering effects of some poor decisions. The high
disequilibrium in the public sector's deficit, together with the rapid
debt accumulation of previous years, threw the economy into a tail-
spin, as foreign credits were suspended. The new government that
entered in December 1982 also had to cope with plunging confi-
dence levels created by the abrupt and unexpected expropriation of
the Mexican-owned private commercial banks. This included the
establishment of controls on all foreign currency transactions and
the forced liquidation of dollar denominated deposits in Mexican
banks.
The establishment of currency controls has been damaging to
confidence because the population had repeatedly been assured,
through the years, that currency markets would remain open. Also,
Mexico's proximity to the United States makes the operation of
controls unworkable. Without going into the administrative details,
suffice it to say that more than five million Mexicans live in the
Mexico-U.S. border area and that people of both nationalities cross
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the border up to 275 million times per year. This situation clearly
makes exchange controls impossible.
In 1982, the government had to cope simultaneously with foreign
banks suspending credits, considerable arrears on private debt, de-
clining terms of trade, and a stunned population uneasy about the
future.
When the administration took over, production and employment
declined while inflation rose. The government imposed harsh fiscal
discipline in order to improve the battered economy. The govern-
ment trimmed the budget through steep increases in taxes, in-
creases in the prices of goods and services provided by the govern-
ment, and lowered expenditures. In 1983 falling wages and profits
halved the public deficit and improved the balance of payments.
For the first time in over four decades, Mexico had a surplus in its
current account, meaning that exports of goods and services were
greater than imports, including interest payments on the debt. Al-
though inflation reached a historical high of 117% in April 1983, it
fell almost continuously afterwards and output began recuperating
by the end of the year.
The recovery program initiated at the end of 1982 was an im-
mense success. In spite of the overall decline in standards of living
and the small growth in the economy from 1982 to 1984, the econ-
omy showed major improvements in performance aggregates. How-
ever, three things happened to impede a complete reversal of Mex-
ico's financial difficulties.
First, the financial adjustment program was not immediately fol-
lowed by an all-encompassing structural change program. Rather
than initiating such a program as early as 1983, the government
waited until late in 1985. Then, after three years of austerity, the
Mexican citizens would not support another correction program.
Second, oil prices decreased from almost $40 per barrel in 1981,
to $25 per barrel in 1985. In February, 1986, oil prices collapsed to
below ten dollars per barrel. Since oil accounts for 60% of the
country's foreign exchange and over 30% of government revenue,
the impact of the declining oil prices was massive. Regardless of
efforts which had already taken place to reduce the government
deficit the decline in oil prices hit hard. Assessing the government's
actions should take into account the recent fall in oil prices, a ma-
jor event for which the Mexican government cannot be blamed. It
is critical to assess what the government has done and has not done
since the end of 1982. Finally, the public deficits the country in-
1987]
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curred through the 1970 were paid and continue to be paid even
though there has been an adjustment in public finances. Payment of
previous deficits and the decline in oil revenue are still responsible
for an enormous gap in government accounts.
II. GOVERNMENT FINANCES
The main thrust of government economic policy since 1982 has
been to reduce the gap between government income and expendi-
tures. That deficit was reduced from 18% of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) to 9% in 1983. However, it has since remained
stagnant at around 9% indicating that the effort has fallen short of
both the avowed governmental goals and the economic need. For
example, the financial sector has had to finance that deficit, which
has consumed most of the resources available, causing credit for
private firms to be very scarce and very expensive.
The government has been forced to allocate the largest share of
the budget to peso debt servicing. Due to the very high levels of
inflation, the cost of government debt is inflation plus a real inter-
est. By separating the government figures and isolating the real rate
of interest that the government pays on its debts in pesos, the fiscal
deficit changes significantly. Over one-third of what the Mexican
government spends goes to service its debt in pesos. By separating
the real rate of interest from the nominal one, the amount the gov-
ernment spends on paying salaries, making investments, and servic-
ing inflated debts incurred in the previous decade can be accounted
for. The government has been able to reduce its "operational" defi-
cit quite dramatically from 1982 through 1985, to a point where it
even attained a surplus in 1983 and 1984. In 1986, the operational
deficit increased to 4% of the GDP because of the decline in reve-
nue due to the fall in oil prices. Considering that the decline in oil
revenues amounted to 6% of the GDP and that government ac-
counts were already in balance in 1985, the obvious conclusion is
that the government adjusted its accounts by 2% of the GDP. In
spite of this, the financial deficit (the more conventional measure of
the deficit, which includes all interest payments), will probably rise
to approximately 17% of the GDP in 1986.
When adjusted for inflation, public finances have actually been
considerably strengthened. This has been done essentially by in-
creasing public sector income from 27.8% of the GDP in 1981 to
32.2% in 1985, including direct taxes as well as sales of goods and
services by parastatal firms. On the other hand, public expenditures
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which had increased from 41.4% of the GDP in 1981 to 46.3% in
1982 have declined to 40.6% in 1985. If one deletes the nominal
interest payments on government debt, the figures are significantly
smaller.1
Table 12 implies that non-interest expenditures have been re-
duced by an astounding 9.1 percentage points of GDP from 1982 to
1985, a reduction unparalleled in any other country. This has re-
sulted from lower real wages, diminished public investment, and
some trimming of the public sector. Because real wages and invest-
ment have been so depressed, any future budgetary adjustments
will have to lean more on the reduction of the parastatal sector.
Obviously, for economic growth, government investment in the in-
frastructure and real wages would have to be increased. Neither
can be done at present given the current size of the public debt,
both foreign and domestic. If raw percentages do not convey a con-
crete picture regarding the budgets performance in the past few
years, consider the following examples on the income side.
From December 1981 to July 1986 the consumer price index has
risen 13.8 times. However, from December 1981 to August 1986
the price of bread has risen 24 times, the price of tortillas 17.4
times, the price of sugar 9.4 times, monthly telephone bills 20
times, gasoline 21 times, diesel fuel 43 times, kerosene 92 times,
and laminated steel 15 times. These substantial relative price in-
creases have strengthened public finances directly, have reduced the
need for transfers, and have curtailed public investment needs arti-
ficially induced through subsidized prices. Needless to say, these
price increases have dramatically altered the spending patterns of
the average Mexican. While minimum wages have lost about 40%
in terms of purchasing power since 1981, prices of basic staples
have increased faster than inflation. But many of these prices had
been stagnant for more than a decade. For example, the charge for
a subway ride had been one peso from the 1960s until 1985. So, the
1.
TABLE I






Source: Fiscal Information. Treasury Department
2. See supra note 1.
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impact of these increases may not be that harsh. However, the nec-
essary corrections have taken place in a very short time frame, with
obvious consequences.
III. OTHER GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, 1982-1986
Aside from adjusting the government budget and the size of the
public sector, other policies have also begun, such as gradually
opening the economy to foreign trade.
Foreign trade has been managed, since the 1960s, essentially
through import quotas controlled by import permits. These quotas
have been used to either ban imports or to direct industrial produc-
tion. Though the original purpose of this policy was to promote de-
velopment of a competitive domestic industrial base over the years,
excessive protection has led to inefficiency, inflexibility and incapac-
ity to generate exports.
The current administration started out with a tight trade policy
because of the lack of international reserves. As the reserve situa-
tion improved, restrictions on imports were gradually lifted. By the
end of 1986, over 80% of all products will have no import permit
requirements. Furthermore, in 1986 Mexico joined the General
Agreement on Tariffs Trade (GATT). Though much remains to be
done in setting of import tariffs, bureaucratic procedures, and
others, the stage is set for an almost complete external liberaliza-
tion of the economy within the next two years.
There is still a long way to go in revising industrial and trade
policy. Much remains to be done in the sphere of government
owned firms, but there is no question that the policy direction has
firmly changed for the first time in twenty-six years and that the
achievements have been noteworthy. Furthermore, the recent trade
liberalization contains the basic ingredient to make it successful: it
has been consistent. Even with the collapse of oil revenues in 1986,
this policy has survived, thus providing a substantial increase in
non-oil exports. These would have been aborted had the govern-
ment clamped down the controls, as it did in previous foreign ex-
change crises (1975-1976 and 1981-1982).
A considerable improvement in overall economic aggregates has
been accomplished. Mexico's 1986 recession resulted from decreas-
ing revenue due to declining oil prices rather than a major altera-
tion in the correction program. Yet, some problems remain unal-
tered and are a formidable hindrance to renewed growth. Some of
these problems are internal and must be addressed, but others lie
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beyond Mexico's borders.
In order to benefit the country's future output, Mexico's enor-
mous debt should have been used for high-yield investments in in-
frastructure, education, and health. If the debt had been channelled
to productive projects which contributed to higher levels of produc-
tion, more efficiency, and more competitiveness, then it would have
been fully payable and Mexicans would be thriving. Mexicans rec-
ognize that the debt incurred over the last decade is too large, and
is unsupported by an equivalent level of assets. Obvious manifesta-
tions of these recognitions are that Mexicans feel burdened by debt
and have implicitly been seeking to evade its repayment through
migration, capital flight, and by disuse of the established financial
system to obtain cash and credit. This negative response engenders
negative expectations, and has contributed to a loss of confidence.
The total foreign debt has increased from 85 billion in 1982 to an
expected 110 billion in 1987. Most of the additions to the 85 billion
of 1982 have been borrowed to keep interest payments current.
This is clearly no solution because it means that the country has to
pay more interest every year for money whose use it never enjoyed.
It should come as no surprise that secondary markets are discount-
ing Mexico's debt quite heavily.
While the financial adjustment has been- very thorough, its social
consequences have been heavy. During the past four years real min-
imum wages have declined by up to 40%, and the per capita income
of the Mexican people has declined by close to 10% since 1981.
Though relatively few people have lost their jobs, very few young
people entering the labor force have been able to get jobs. This
might not sound so bad. However, the problem is that many per-
ceive that there will be no better future should the same policies be
pursued. Negative expectations have made a difficult situation into
a potentially unbearable one.
Arguably, a vicious circle like this can be severed if there is large
enough and rapid enough internal adjustment. A drastic approach
may have merit, particularly if its result could reverse negative ex-
pectations. However, the size of the adjustment needed, given the
enormous size of the foreign debt, is too large to be borne inter-
nally. Mexico's current debt problem is similar to reparations im-
posed upon Germany after World War I. Germany suffered a sub-
stantial real transfer of resources to the rest of the world.
Eventually, such a burden became too harsh to bear. Mexico's debt
should be viewed in this light and under this focus Mexico's debt
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burden should be shared.
IV. CONCLUSION
The only way out of the vicious circle into which the present
levels of foreign debt have led Mexico is a radical shift in the struc-
ture of the country's economy. This must occur in the context of a
radical shift in the size and structure of the country's debt. This
would entail incorporating the country's economy into world trade
patterns in such a way that Mexico becomes a highly competitive
economy. Of course, this is easier said than done. First of all, it
would be impossible to carry out such a program without a dra-
matic change in the present structure of foreign debt servicing. The
burden of that change would have to be shared by the creditors and
country alike. The second major hindrance is the nature and di-
mension of the necessary structural shift, which would create many
dislocations and political pressures. The situation does not call for
abandoning the restructuring. It calls for a carefully planned pro-
cess of gradual adjustment allowing for a transition period, and
mechanisms that would avoid high unemployment and other unac-
ceptable consequences. Finally, for such a program to be successful,
political participation would be necessary. Without these elements,
structural change could not take place and the population at large
would not accept its costs, no matter what the theoretical benefits.
Nobody doubts the need to restructure Mexico's economy. The
issue is how to deal with the domestic realities. There is the need to
adjust the economy and at the same time compensate for the nega-
tive by-products of the adjustment process. There is the unavoida-
ble need to re-think debt and debt servicing, both in Mexico and
within the international financial community. Without the adjust-
ment, Mexico's economy will not be able to advance; but without a
radical change in debt policy, the economy cannot adjust further.
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